The Chinese model

【首文】中国模式

Xi’s new economy

习氏新经济

China’s strongman leader is shaping a new form of state capitalism. Don’t underestimate it

中国的强人领袖正在塑造一种新型国家资本主义。不要小看它

AMERICA’S CONFRONTATION with China is escalating dangerously. Earlier this month the White House has announced what may amount to an imminent ban on TikTok and WeChat (two Chinese apps), imposed sanctions on Hong Kong’s leaders and sent a cabinet member to Taiwan. This ratcheting up of pressure partly reflects electioneering: being tough on China is a key strut of President Donald Trump’s campaign. It is partly ideological, underscoring the urgency the administration’s hawks attach to pushing back on all fronts against an increasingly assertive China. But it also reflects an assumption that has underpinned the Trump administration’s attitude to China from the beginning of the trade war: that this approach will yield results, because China’s steroidal state capitalism is weaker than it looks.

美国与中国的对抗正在危险升级。8月上旬，白宫宣布了可能等同于即将封禁TikTok和WeChat这两款中资应用的命令，又对香港政府官员实施制裁，还派出一位内阁官员访问台湾。如此连番加压一方面是为了竞选拉票：对中国强硬是特朗普竞选连任的一个关键支杆。另一方面也有意识形态的因素，突显了特朗普政府的鹰派人士迫切想要全线击退一个日益强硬的中国。但这也反映出自中美贸易战开打之日起特朗普政府对华态度背后的一种假设：中国这种打了激素般的国家资本主义外强中干，所以这种打压招数能奏效。

The logic is alluringly simple. Yes, China has delivered growth, but only by relying on an unsustainable formula of debt, subsidies, cronyism and intellectual-property theft. Press hard enough and its economy could buckle, forcing its leaders to make concessions and, eventually, to liberalise their state-led system. As the secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, puts it, “Freedom-loving nations of the world must induce China to change.”

这种逻辑简洁得迷人。诚然，中国实现了增长，但靠的是一套不可持续的模式——债务、补贴、裙带关系和窃取知识产权。施以足够大的压力，其经济就可能垮塌，迫使其领导人让步，最终开放其由政府主导的体系。正如美国国务卿蓬佩奥所说：“世界上热爱自由的国家必须促使中国改变。”

Simple, but wrong. China’s economy was less harmed by the tariff war than expected. It has been far more resilient to the covid-19 pandemic—the IMF forecasts growth of 1% in 2020 compared with an 8% drop in America. Shenzhen is the world’s best-performing big stockmarket this year, not New York. And China’s leader, Xi Jinping, is reinventing state capitalism for the 2020s. Forget belching steel plants and quotas. Mr Xi’s new economic agenda is to make markets and innovation work better within tightly defined boundaries and subject to all-seeing Communist Party surveillance. It isn’t Milton Friedman, but this ruthless mix of autocracy, technology and dynamism could propel growth for years.

很简洁，但错了。关税战对中国经济的损害不像预期般严重。而它在新冠疫情中的复原力却又强得多——国际货币基金组织（IMF）预测2020年中国经济将增长1％，而美国将下跌8％。今年全球表现最佳的大型股票市场是深圳，而非纽约。而且，中国国家主席习近平正面向未来十年重塑国家资本主义。忘掉冒着浓烟的钢铁厂和配额制度吧。习近平的新经济目标是要让市场和创新在严格界定的范围内更好地发挥作用，并接受中国共产党的全面监督。这不是米尔顿·弗里德曼那一套，但这种把专制、技术和活力坚决混合在一起的方式可能会在未来多年里推动中国经济增长。

Underestimating China’s economy is hardly a new phenomenon. Since 1995 China’s share of world GDP at market prices has risen from 2% to 16%, despite waves of Western scepticism. Silicon Valley chiefs dismissed Chinese tech firms as copycats; Wall Street short-sellers said ghost towns of empty apartments would bring a banking crash; statisticians worried that the GDP figures were fiddled and speculators warned that capital flight would cause a currency crisis. China has defied the sceptics because its state capitalism has adapted, changing shape. Twenty years ago, for example, the emphasis was on trade, but now exports account for only 17% of GDP. In the 2010s officials gave tech firms such as Alibaba and Tencent just enough space to grow into giants and, in Tencent’s case, to create a messaging app, WeChat, that is also an instrument of party control.

低估中国经济不是什么新鲜事。尽管不断受到西方的质疑，但按市场价格计算，中国占世界GDP的比例已从1995年的2％上升到16％。硅谷的高管对中国的“山寨”科技公司很不屑；华尔街的卖空者称大量公寓空置的“鬼城”将引发银行业崩溃；统计人员担心中国的GDP数据造假；投机者警告资本外逃会导致货币危机。中国的表现却出乎这些怀疑者所料，因为它的国家资本主义已经改变形态以适应现实。例如，20年前其重心是贸易，而现在出口仅占GDP的17％。过去十年里，政府给了阿里巴巴和腾讯等科技公司刚好足够大的空间成长为巨头，而以腾讯为例，它开发的消息应用微信也是党的一种管控工具。

Now the next phase of Chinese state capitalism is under way—call it Xinomics. Since he took power in 2012 Mr Xi’s political goal has been to tighten the party’s grip and crush dissent at home and abroad. His economic agenda is designed to increase order and resilience against threats. For good reason. Public and private debt has soared since 2008 to almost 300% of GDP. Business is bifurcated between stodgy state firms and a Wild West private sector that is innovative but faces predatory officials and murky rules. As protectionism spreads, Chinese firms risk being locked out of markets and denied access to Western technology.

如今，中国的国家资本主义已迈入下一阶段，不妨称之为“习经济”。自2012年上台以来，习近平的政治目标一直是加强党的控制，铲除国内外异议。其经济目标是提升秩序和抵御威胁的韧性。这有充分理由。自2008年以来，中国的政府和私人债务已飙升至GDP的近300％。其商业分为两支，一支是臃肿守旧的国有企业，另一支是狂野西部式的私营部门，后者善于创新，但要面对虎视眈眈的官员和模糊不清的规则。随着贸易保护主义的蔓延，中国公司面临被金融市场拒之门外和被西方技术断供的风险。

Xinomics has three elements. First, tight control over the economic cycle and the debt machine. The days of supersized fiscal and lending binges are over. Banks have been forced to recognise off-balance-sheet activity and build up buffers. More lending is taking place through a cleaned-up bond market. Unlike its reaction to the financial crisis of 2008-09, the government’s response to covid-19 has been restrained, with a stimulus worth about 5% of GDP, less than half the size of America’s.

习经济有三个要素。首先，严格控制经济周期和债务机器。超大规模的财政支出和贷款狂潮的时代已经结束。银行被迫承认表外业务活动并增加缓冲。更多借贷正通过已整顿过的债券市场发生。与2008年至2009年金融危机时的反应不同，政府面对新冠疫情应对克制，推出的经济刺激方案仅为GDP的5％左右，不到美国水平的一半。

The second strand is a more efficient administrative state, whose rules apply uniformly across the economy. Even as Mr Xi has used party-imposed law to sow fear in Hong Kong, he has constructed a commercial legal system in the mainland that is far more responsive to businesses. Bankruptcies and patent lawsuits, once rare, have risen fivefold since he took office in 2012. Red tape has been trimmed: it now takes nine days to set up a company. More predictable rules should allow markets to work more smoothly, boosting the economy’s productivity.

第二个要素是更高效的行政国，在整个经济中实施统一的规管。习近平通过共产党强制立法在香港立威之时，他也在中国大陆建立了一套商业法律制度，大幅提升了对企业的响应。破产和专利诉讼过去在中国很少见，但自他2012年上台以来已增长了四倍。繁琐的官僚程序被简化：现在注册成立一家公司只需要九天。更可预测的规则应该会让市场更平稳地运转，从而提高整个经济的生产率。

The final element is to blur the boundary between state and private firms. State-run companies are being compelled to boost their financial returns and draw in private investors. Meanwhile the state is exerting strategic control over private firms, through party cells within them. A credit blacklisting system penalises firms that misbehave. Instead of indiscriminate industrial policy, such as the “Made in China 2025” campaign launched in 2015, Mr Xi is shifting to a sharp focus on supply-chain choke-points where China is either vulnerable to foreign coercion or where it can exert influence abroad. That means building up self-sufficiency in key technologies, including semiconductors and batteries.

最后一个要素是模糊国有企业与私营企业的界限。国有企业被迫提高财务回报并吸引私人投资者。与此同时，政府通过在私营企业中设立党组织来对它们实施战略控制。失信黑名单系统会惩罚不守规矩的企业。相比2015年推出的“中国制造2025”这类笼统的产业政策，习近平现在转而精准聚焦于供应链上的咽喉点——那些中国易受外国胁迫或者反过来可在海外施加影响的环节。这意味着要在半导体和电池等关键技术上实现自给自足。

Xinomics has performed well in the short term. The build-up of debt had slowed before covid-19 struck and the twin shocks of the trade war and the pandemic have not led to a financial crisis. State-run firms’ productivity is creeping up and foreign investors are pouring cash into a new generation of Chinese tech firms. The real test, however, will come over time. China hopes that its new techno-centric form of central planning can sustain innovation, but history suggests that diffuse decision-making, open borders and free speech are the magic ingredients.

短期来看，习经济表现不俗。疫情爆发前中国的债务增长已经放缓，而贸易战和疫情的双重冲击并未导致金融危机。国有企业的生产率正缓步提升，外国投资者纷纷向新一代中国科技公司大举投资。然而，真正的考验会逐渐到来。中国希望这种以技术为中心的新型中央计划模式能让创新持续，但从历史来看，分散决策、开放边界和言论自由是带来创新的神奇原料。

One thing is clear: the hope for confrontation followed by capitulation is misguided. America and its allies must prepare for a far longer contest between open societies and China’s state capitalism. Containment won’t work: unlike the Soviet Union, China’s huge economy is sophisticated and integrated with the rest of the world. Instead the West needs to build up its diplomatic capacity and create new, stable rules that allow co-operation with China in some areas, such as fighting climate change and pandemics, and commerce to continue alongside stronger protections for human rights and national security. The strength of China’s $14trn state-capitalist economy cannot be wished away. Time to shed that illusion. ■

有一点是明确的：希望正面对抗能让中国缴械投降，那是打错了算盘。美国及其盟国要做好准备，开放社会与中国国家资本主义之争远非一时半日能分出胜负。围堵策略是行不通的：与苏联不同，中国规模庞大的经济很是复杂，且与世界其他地区融合在一起。相反，西方需要提升外交能力，创建稳定的新规则以便在某些领域与中国合作，例如对抗气候变化和流行病，并且能在加强保护人权和国家安全的同时继续开展商务往来。中国14万亿美元的国家资本主义经济的实力不是靠一厢情愿就会灰飞烟灭的。是时候丢掉这种幻想了。