People’s Bank of China

中国人民银行

Conforming to norms

遵循常规

As central banks ramp up their money-printing, China is the odd one out

各国央行加印货币，中国自成一派

A bastion of monetary normality

YI GANG, THE head of China’s central bank, is fond of saying that he wants to run “normal” monetary policy. By that he means keeping interest rates well above zero, ensuring that the yield curve slopes upwards and avoiding direct purchases of the government’s bonds—much of which, in fact, make the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) a highly abnormal central bank these days. The clearest sign of this is its balance-sheet. In terms of its assets, the PBoC has gone from the undisputed heavyweight to a middleweight. Its restraint is a combination of two different strands in its pursuit of policy normality: an avoidance of the unusual manoeuvres that have become common elsewhere and a reversal of some of the unusual manoeuvres that used to be common in China.

中国央行行长易纲总爱说自己想推行“正常”的货币政策。他指的是保持利率远高于零，确保收益率曲线向上倾斜，并避免直接购买政府债券。而实际上，很多这些措施现如今让中国人民银行成了一家非常反常的央行。最明显的信号是它的资产负债表。就资产而言，中国央行已从无可争议的重量级央行变成了中量级。它的克制体现为从两个不同方面追求实现政策常态化：避免执行在国外已变得平常的不寻常操作；扭转一些过去在中国很普遍的不寻常操作。

Starting in the early 2000s, the PBoC accumulated assets at a prodigious rate, almost entirely in the form of foreign-exchange reserves. The build-up was a result of its policy of limiting the yuan’s appreciation at a time when China was running a giant trade surplus. The PBoC’s assets peaked at 70% of GDP in 2008, more than twice the level of its peers in America, Europe and Japan at the time. But as China’s foreign-exchange reserves have shrunk and then stabilised over the past five years, so has the central bank’s balance-sheet.

从本世纪初开始，人行以惊人的速度积累资产，这些资产几乎全部是外汇储备。这是当年中国在存在巨额贸易顺差的时期实行限制人民币升值的政策的结果。人行的资产规模在2008年达到巅峰，等同于GDP的70％，是当时美国、欧洲和日本央行资产水平的两倍多。但随着中国外汇储备缩水，而后在过去五年里稳定下来，人行的资产负债表也呈现同样的走势。

By contrast, the assets of the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan have mostly risen over the past decade or so, as they undertook quantitative easing, buying up government bonds and, in some cases, corporate paper and equities. In order to minimise the economic damage from the coronavirus pandemic, they are buying yet more bonds. The PBoC, though, has barely added to its assets (see chart). As a share of GDP, the size of its balance-sheet is now roughly the same as the Fed’s—around 35%.

相比之下，在过去十年左右的时间里，随着美联储、欧洲央行和日本央行采取量化宽松政策，购买政府债券，有时还购入公司债券和股票，它们的资产大多有所增加。为最大程度减少新冠疫情造成的经济损失，它们正在购入更多债券。但人行的资产却几乎没有增加（见图表）。按占GDP比重衡量，人行资产负债表的规模目前与美联储大致相同，约为35％。

In part China’s restraint is because the economy is in relatively better shape, with the virus all but stopped and a growth rebound well under way. Partly it also reflects what might be called the Kipling doctrine in China’s bid to promote the yuan’s international role: if you can keep your money supply in check when all about you are expanding theirs like mad, then reserve-currency status may some day be yours.

中国的克制一方面是因为疫情基本被遏制，经济正强势反弹，因而整个经济体状况相对较好。另一方面也反映了中国为提升人民币的国际地位而奉行或许可称为“吉卜林主义”的做法：如果旁人都在疯狂扩大货币供应而你能把持住，那么终有一天储备货币的地位会是你的 。

There is also a deeper reason for China’s apparent conservatism, though. It is gradually reversing some of its extraordinary past interventions. In order to maintain an undervalued currency, the PBoC printed as much yuan as needed to buy the foreign currency streaming into China. To prevent that newly created money from causing inflation, it then had to soak much of it back up, or to “sterilise” the inflows. It did that primarily by jacking up reserve-requirement ratios for commercial banks. At the peak in 2011, banks were forced to place 21.5% of their deposits at the central bank. After repeated cuts, including two since the coronavirus outbreak, mid-sized banks now need to set aside only 9.5% of their deposits, freeing them to lend more. Coupled with targeted liquidity injections and old-fashioned moral suasion (a powerful tool in a largely state-owned financial system), the PBoC can support the economy without dramatically scaling up its balance-sheet.

不过，中国表面的保守还有更深层次的原因。它正在逐步扭转过去一些非常规的干预措施。为保持人民币汇率被低估，人行需要加印足够多的人民币来购买流入中国的外币。为防止加印的货币导致通货膨胀，它必须把其中很大一部分吸收回来，或可称为“冲销”流入。主要方法是提高商业银行的准备金率。在2011年的顶峰时期，中国的商业银行必须将其存款的21.5％存入人行。在多次下调（包括疫情爆发以来的两次）后，中型银行现在只需要留出9.5％的存款准备金，因而可以把更多资金用于贷款。加上定向流动性注入和老式的道义说教（在基本为国有的金融体系内，这是件有力的工具），人行可以在不大幅扩大资产负债表的情况下为经济提供支持。

Still, the very stability of that balance-sheet has led to questions about whether it may be accumulating foreign-exchange reserves on the sly. The main reason for suspicion is that even as China has notched up huge trade surpluses ($62bn in July, just shy of a monthly record set in May), its reserves have barely budged. But a focus on trade overlooks the cash that has left through other channels. In the second quarter, net financial outflows (excluding direct investment) soared to $104bn—equivalent to two-thirds of trade earnings—partly thanks to mainlanders punting on stocks in Hong Kong. This points to one more way in which the monetary system looks more normal—it is becoming fiendishly complex to monitor all the cash criss-crossing China’s borders as, little by little, it opens up its capital account. ■

人行资产负债表的这种稳定性毕竟还是引来了外界怀疑：它是否在悄悄积累外汇储备？怀疑的主因是在中国出现巨额贸易顺差（7月为620亿美元，略低于5月创下的单月新高）之时，其外汇储备几无变化。但是，只盯着贸易这一块忽略了从其他渠道流出的资金。第二季度资金净流出（不包括直接投资）飙升至1040亿美元，相当于贸易收益的三分之二，部分原因是大陆居民大举购入香港股票。而这又从另一个方面让中国的货币体系显得更加正常了——随着中国一点一点地放开对资本账户的管制，要监控所有的资金跨境流动正变得异常复杂。