Sino-American commercial relations

中美商业关系

Endgame

终局之战

The Trump administration wants to drive the Chinese and American corporate worlds apart. How far can it go?

特朗普政府想让中美企业界脱钩。会走到何种地步？

DURING HIS term in office, Donald Trump has often bashed China while occasionally praising its leader, Xi Jinping. Similar two-mindedness characterises his administration. China hawks, led by Robert Lighthizer, his trade representative, and Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state, have tussled for influence with more dovish figures such as Steven Mnuchin, the treasury secretary, who have tried to prevent a rupture between the two giants. Companies and investors from both countries have watched the contest closely.

特朗普在任内经常抨击中国，但偶尔又会赞扬中国领导人习近平。他的政府也表现出类似的两面性。以贸易代表罗伯特·莱特希泽（Robert Lighthizer）和国务卿蓬佩奥为首的对华鹰派一直在与财政部长史蒂文·姆努钦（Steven Mnuchin）等更偏鸽派的官员争夺影响力。姆努钦试图避免两个大国关系破裂。中美企业和投资者都密切关注这场争斗。

In the past 18 months the hawks have been ascendant. Now, blaming China for spreading the covid-19 virus that has pushed America and the rest of the world into recession, thus helping to dent the president’s chances of re-election in November, they have prevailed.

过去18个月里，鹰派势力渐盛。现在，靠着指责中国传播新冠病毒导致美国和世界其他地区陷入衰退，进而削弱了特朗普在11月获得连任的机会，鹰派已占得上风。

On August 6th Mr Trump issued two startling executive orders giving American firms 45 days to unwind all commercial relations with ByteDance, the Chinese owner of TikTok, a video-sharing app popular with youngsters, and with WeChat, a Chinese messaging and payments super-app widely used by Chinese around the world to communicate with those back home. The previous day Mr Pompeo unveiled a “Clean Network” policy to protect America’s telecoms infrastructure and services against “aggressive intrusions by malign actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party”. This would extend to other Chinese firms, including mobile providers, the sanctions with which America has tried to cripple Huawei, China’s telecoms-equipment giant. In response to a harsh new security law in Hong Kong Mr Trump has stripped the Chinese territory of its special status on immigration and trade. And a presidential working group has declared that in order to trade on an American stock exchange, Chinese companies must give American regulators unfettered access to their books.

特朗普于8月6日签署了两项令人吃惊的行政令，要求美国公司在45天内解除与中国公司字节跳动和微信海外版WeChat的一切商业关系。字节跳动拥有深受年轻人欢迎的视频分享应用TikTok，而WeChat是全球华人广泛用来和国内亲友联络的一款消息和支付超级应用。就在前一天，蓬佩奥宣布了“清洁网络”政策，要保护美国的电信基础设施和服务免受“中国共产党之类的恶意行为者的侵扰”。这一政策将把此前试图重创中国电信设备巨头华为的制裁手段扩展到其他中国公司，包括移动供应商。香港实施严厉的国安法后，特朗普做出反应，取消了这块中国领土在移民和贸易方面的特殊地位。同时，一个总统工作小组宣布，在美国证券交易所上市交易的中国公司必须允许美国监管机构不受限制地查阅其账目。

All this marks an escalation in the economic war between the two countries. The fallout could be gargantuan. Deutsche Bank reckons that lost revenues in China, the expense of moving factories out of the country and compliance with the Chinese and American technospheres’ diverging standards could cost global technology firms $3.5trn over the next five years. A large chunk of that burden would fall on American firms. The question is, how bad can things get?

这一切都标志着两国经济战的升级。其负面影响可能是巨大的。德意志银行估计，未来五年，由于在中国的收入损失、将工厂迁出中国的费用，以及遵守中美日益相异的技术标准，全球科技公司可能要付出高达3.5万亿美元的代价。其中很大一部分将由美国公司承担。问题是，情况会变得多糟？

It is tempting to dismiss it all as pre-election theatre. Tom Wheeler, a former regulator and venture capitalistnow at the Brookings Institution, a think-tank, calls Mr Trump’s moves “showbiz in lieu of substance”. Mr Wheeler has a point. But rhetoric can have real-world consequences. And in some ways Mr Trump is going beyond mere play-acting.

人们很容易认为这一切不过是大选前的作秀。曾是监管官员、风险投资家，现就职于智库布鲁金斯学会（Brookings Institution）的汤姆·惠勒（Tom Wheeler）称特朗普的举动是“有名无实的表演”。他说得有些道理。但虚张声势也可能产生实际后果。而在某些方面，特朗普已经不仅仅是在演戏。

First, explains an American lawyer involved in federal trade and security cases, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act grants the president powers to protect America against an “unusual and extraordinary threat”. These powers are largely undefined but extremely broad. Hardliners sense that a window of opportunity for action will close soon and so have decided, in the lawyer’s words, to “advance their agenda before November”.

首先，一名参与了联邦贸易和安全案件的美国律师解释道，《国际紧急经济权力法》（International Emergency Economic Powers Act）赋予了总统保护美国免受“特殊和超常威胁”的权力。这些权力在很大程度上没有明确定义，但范围极广。强硬派意识到行动的机会窗口稍纵即逝，因此决定“抢在11月之前推进他们的计划”，这位律师说。

Second, many of the Trump administration’s anti-Chinese actions may be hard to unwind, even if president’s challenger, Joe Biden, wins the White House for the Democrats in November. As facts on the ground have changed, Sino-American commercial relations have undergone fundamental change in the past two years, says Edward Tse of Gao Feng, a consultancy.

其次，即使总统的挑战者拜登在11月代表民主党赢得白宫宝座，特朗普政府的许多反华措施也可能难以解除。高风咨询公司的谢祖墀表示，现实状况已经改变，中美商业关系在过去两年已发生根本性的变化。

If the hardline efforts to wrench the two economies further apart succeed, Chinese firms will suffer. A mainland tech entrepreneur stranded in America by covid-19 says his American partners remain keen to do business, but his lawyers warn of two to three years of tension. The TikTok case is so arbitrary, he says, that “no foreign entity in America is fully safe.”

如果强硬派成功令两个经济体进一步脱钩，中国企业将遭受损失。一位因疫情被困在美国的中国大陆科技企业家表示，他的美国合作伙伴仍然渴望合作，但他的律师警告说未来两三年的局势都会比较紧张。他说，TikTok事件实在太过专断，让人感觉“在美国没有什么外国实体是真的安全。”

The flows of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) and venture capital into America have declined (see chart). The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, a federal body, has come under increasing pressure to scupper Chinese takeovers. A tougher audit regime for American-listed firms—which enjoys rare bipartisan support in Congress—would mean that about $1trn in Chinese companies’ market capitalisation “will have to start thinking about a new home”, says Arthur Kroeber of GaveKal, an advisory firm.

中国对美国的直接投资和风险投资均已下降（见图表）。联邦机构美国外国投资委员会受到越来越大的压力去阻止中资收购。对在美国上市的公司实行更严格的审计制度——这一提案在国会罕见地得到了两党的一致支持——意味着约一万亿美元的中国公司市值“将不得不开始考虑到别处安家”，咨询公司佳富龙洲（GaveKal）的葛艺豪（Arthur Kroeber）说。 

The Chinese would not be the only victims. American firms have robust and growing businesses in China, where they generate about 5% of global sales. Despite trade tensions American FDI in China actually rose in 2019. Before the pandemic Nike’s Chinese sales of sporting goods had grown by double digits for 22 straight quarters. GM sells more cars in China than in America. Tesla may make between 25% and 40% of its electric cars in China next year, reckons Bernstein, a research firm.

中国人不会是唯一的受害方。美国公司在中国的业务经营稳健、不断增长，约占其全球销售额的5%。两国贸易关系紧张之时，2019年美国对华直接投资实际上仍有增加。在疫情之前，耐克在中国的体育商品销售已连续22个季度保持两位数增长。通用汽车在中国卖出的车比在美国更多。研究公司盛博估计，明年特斯拉可能有25%到40%的电动汽车将在中国生产。

Mr Kroeber estimates American firms have over $700bn in assets in China and book about $500bn a year in domestic sales there. A new survey of members by the US-China Business Council, which represents big American firms, reveals that more now consider China a top strategic priority (16%) and top-five priority (83%) than did in 2019. Few plan to decamp from China.

葛艺豪估计，美国公司的在华资产超过7000亿美元，每年在中国的销售收入约为5000亿美元。代表美国大公司的美中贸易全国委员会（US-China Business Council）对成员的最新调查显示，与2019年相比，更多企业现在将中国视为首要战略重点（16%）和前五重点之一（83%）。几乎没有企业打算撤离中国。

America Inc, in other words, has a lot on the line. James McGregor of APCO, a consulting firm, says that Americans risk forsaking a market to European, South Korean or Japanese rivals. Wall Street could get squeezed by the push to delist Chinese firms. So far this year American banks raked in $414m in fees helping Chinese firms with initial public offerings and follow-on share sales, up by nearly a quarter from a year ago.

换言之，美国企业有重大利益风险。咨询公司安可（APCO）的麦健陆（James McGregor）表示，美国有可能将中国市场拱手让给欧洲、韩国或日本的竞争对手。华尔街可能会因为受到压力要让中国公司退市而致使利润受挤压。今年迄今为止，美国各大银行协助中国公司上市和增发的佣金收入达4.14亿美元，同比增长近四分之一。

The biggest victim of decoupling would be America’s tech giants, many of which rely heavily on Chinese demand, as well as on Chinese suppliers. China represents over a quarter of global sales in sectors ranging from electronic components to internet software to semiconductors (see chart). Qualcomm, a chip giant, earns about two-thirds of its worldwide revenues in China and is lobbying furiously to soften sanctions against Huawei, a big client. Greater China (which includes Taiwan) makes up around 15% of Apple’s global revenues. If Mr Trump’s executive order forces American firms to halt all dealings with WeChat’s parent, Tencent, then Apple will be forced to block Weixin, WeChat’s local version. If that happens, Chinese smartphone users would choose Weixin over iPhones. Ming-Chi Kuo, a seasoned Apple-watcher, warns that a harsh ban could lead to a global decline in iPhone sales of as much as 25-30%.

脱钩的最大受害者将是美国的科技巨头，它们中有许多不仅高度依赖中国的供应商，也严重依赖中国的需求。从电子元件、互联网软件到半导体，中国在许多行业的全球销售额中占比都超过四分之一（见图表）。芯片巨头高通全球营收的三分之二来自中国，它正在大力游说放松对其大客户华为的制裁。苹果的大中华区（包括台湾市场）约占其全球营收的15%。如果特朗普的行政令迫使美国公司中止与WeChat的母公司腾讯做任何交易，那么苹果将被迫下架中国大陆版微信。在这种情况下，中国智能手机用户将会选择微信而放弃iPhone。资深苹果分析师郭明錤警告说，严苛的禁令可能会导致iPhone的全球销量下跌25%至30%之多。

The new troubles reported by one executive at a big American chemicals firm may be a straw in the wind. China has been a great market for his company, he says, and the government at the national and provincial level remains solicitous and supportive. But local rivals have started making appeals to his Chinese clients. “Why would you buy products from an American firm at this time?” they ask. Why indeed.■

美国一家大型化工企业的高管碰到的新麻烦或许是一种征兆。他说，中国一直是他公司的重要市场，而且中央和省级政府仍然关心和支持公司。但本土竞争对手已经开始劝导他的中国客户。“这个时候你们怎么还从美国公司采购呢？”他们问。是啊，为什么呢？